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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs. : 
: Case No. 20040969 
GARY RANDALL WHETTON, 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a plea and subsequent sentencing to ten counts of 
Communications Fraud in violation of U.C.A. § 76-10-1801, and three counts of 
Unlawful Dealing by a Fiduciary, in violation of U.C.A. §76-6-513(2). All thirteen 
counts were second-degree felonies. On October 4, 2004, the Honorable Scott M. 
Hadley signed an entry of judgment, sentence and commitment sentencing the 
Defendant to serve thirteen indeterminate terms of one to fifteen years at the Utah 
State Prison. Six of the counts were ordered to run consecutive to each other. On 
November 3, 2004, the Defendant filed a notice of appeal. This Court has 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e)(2003). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
DIDTHE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 
SENTENCED THE DEFENDANT TO SIX CONSECUTIVE ONE 
TO FIFTEEN YEAR SENTENCES? 
Standard of Review: This should be reviewed under an abuse of discretion 
standard of review. "Sentencing decisions of the trial court are reviewed for abuse 
of discretion, including the decision to grant or deny probation and the decision to 
impose consecutive sentences." State v. McDonald, 110 P.3d 149, 151 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2005). Furthermore, "judges may exercise sentencing discretion [only| within 
those limits established by the legislature." State v. Denney, 776 P.2d 91, 92 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). The trial court's interpretation of U.C.A. 76-3-401 should be 
reviewed for correctness without deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. 
See, Ward v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990). This issue was 
preserved when Defendant's attorney asked the trial judge to sentence the 
Defendant to two consecutive sentences. (R. 244/29). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
U.C.A. §76-3-401 Concurrent or consecutive sentences — Limitations — 
Definition. 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more 
than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for 
the offenses. The court shall state on the record and shall indicate in the order of 
judgment and commitment: 
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively to each 
other; and 
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(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consecutively 
with any other sentences the defendant is already serving. 
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or 
consecutively, the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the 
offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs 
of the defendant. 
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if 
the later offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole, 
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing would be 
inappropriate. 
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the 
sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and 
Parole shall request clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request, the 
court shall enter a clarified order of commitment stating whether the sentences are 
to run consecutively or concurrently. 
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a 
single criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401. 
(6) (a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all 
sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as provided 
under Subsection (6)(b). 
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if: 
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death penalty 
or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or 
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct which 
occurs after his initial sentence or sentences are imposed. 
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant: 
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense; 
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which were 
committed prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or 
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the present 
sentencing court or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction, and the 
conduct giving rise to the present offense did not occur after his initial sentencing 
by any other court. 
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect of 
consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the Board of 
Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been committed for a 
single term that consists of the aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms as 
follows: 
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the 
maximum sentence is considered to be 30 years; and 
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(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if any, 
constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms. 
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently 
with the other or with a sentence presently being served, the term that provides the 
longer remaining imprisonment constitutes the time to be served. 
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of 
individual 
consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity of any sentence 
so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually served under the 
commitments. 
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to 
impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases. 
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed to a 
secure correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has not been 
terminated or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of where the 
person is located. 
U.C.A. § 76-10-1801 Communications fraud — Elements — Penalties. 
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another or to 
obtain from another money, property, or anything of value by means of false or 
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who 
communicates directly or indirectly with any person by any means for the purpose 
of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice is guilty of: 
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is less than $300; 
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000; 
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000; 
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $5,000; and 
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the scheme or artifice to defraud 
is other than the obtaining of something of monetary value. 
(2) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection (1) shall be 
measured by the total value of all property, money, or things obtained or sought to 
be obtained by the scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) except as 
provided in Subsection (l)(e). 
(3) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary element of the offense 
described in Subsection (1). 
(4) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense described in 
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Subsection (1) to permanently deprive any person of property, money, or thing of 
value is not a necessary element of the offense. 
(5) Each separate communication made for the purpose of executing or 
concealing a scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) is a separate act and 
offense of communication fraud. 
(6) (a) To communicate as described in Subsection (1) means to bestow, 
convey, make known, recount, impart; to give by way of information; to talk over; 
or to transmit information. 
(b) Means of communication include but are not limited to use of the mail, 
telephone, telegraph, radio, television, newspaper, computer, and spoken and 
written communication. 
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless the pretenses, 
representations, promises, or material omissions made or omitted were made or 
omitted intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the truth. 
U.C.A. §76-6-513(2) Definitions — Unlawful dealing of property by a fiduciary 
— Penalties. 
(2) A person is guilty of unlawfully dealing with property by a fiduciary if he 
deals with property that has been entrusted to him as a fiduciary, or property of a 
governmental entity, public monies, or of a financial institution, in a manner which 
he knows is a violation of his duty and which involves substantial risk of loss or 
detriment to the owner or to a person for whose benefit the property was entrusted. 
A violation of this Subsection (2) is punishable under Section 76-6-412. 
U.C.A. § 77-27-5 Board of Pardons and Parole authority. 
(1) (a) The Board of Pardons and Parole shall determine by majority decision 
when and under what conditions, subject to this chapter and other laws of the state, 
persons committed to serve sentences in class A misdemeanor cases at penal or 
correctional facilities which are under the jurisdiction of the Department of 
Corrections, and all felony cases except treason or impeachment or as otherwise 
limited by law, may be released upon parole, pardoned, ordered to pay restitution, 
or have their fines, forfeitures, or restitution remitted, or their sentences commuted 
or terminated. 
(b) The board may sit together or in panels to conduct hearings. The chair shall 
appoint members to the panels in any combination and in accordance with rules 
promulgated by the board, except in hearings involving commutation and pardons. 
The chair may participate on any panel and when doing so is chair of the panel. 
The chair of the board may designate the chair for any other panel. 
(c) No restitution may be ordered, no fine, forfeiture, or restitution remitted, no 
parole, pardon, or commutation granted or sentence terminated, except after a full 
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hearing before the board or the board's appointed examiner in open session. Any 
action taken under this subsection other than by a majority of the board shall be 
affirmed by a majority of the board. 
(d) A commutation or pardon may be granted only after a full hearing before the 
board. 
(e) The board may determine restitution as provided in Section 77-27-6 and 
Subsection 77-38a-302(5)(d)(ii). 
(2) (a) In the case of original parole grant hearings, rehearings, and parole 
revocation hearings, timely prior notice of the time and place of the hearing shall 
be given to the defendant, the county or district attorney's office responsible for 
prosecution of the case, the sentencing court, law enforcement officials responsible 
for the defendant's arrest and conviction, and whenever possible, the victim or the 
victim's family. 
(b) Notice to the victim, his representative, or his family shall include 
information provided in Section 77-27-9.5, and any related rules made by the 
board under that section. This information shall be provided in terms that are 
reasonable for the lay person to understand. 
(3) Decisions of the board in cases involving paroles, pardons, commutations or 
terminations of sentence, restitution, or remission of fines or forfeitures are final 
and are not subject to judicial review. Nothing in this section prevents the 
obtaining or enforcement of a civil judgment, including restitution as provided in 
Section 77-27-6. 
(4) This chapter may not be construed as a denial of or limitation of the 
governor's power to grant respite or reprieves in all cases of convictions for 
offenses against the state, except treason or conviction on impeachment. However, 
respites or reprieves may not extend beyond the next session of the Board of 
Pardons and Parole and the board, at that session, shall continue or terminate the 
respite or reprieve, or it may commute the punishment, or pardon the offense as 
provided. In the case of conviction for treason, the governor may suspend 
execution of the sentence until the case is reported to the Legislature at its next 
session. The Legislature shall then either pardon or commute the sentence, or 
direct its execution. 
(5) In determining when, where, and under what conditions offenders serving 
sentences may be paroled, pardoned, have restitution ordered, or have their fines or 
forfeitures remitted, or their sentences commuted or terminated, the board shall 
consider whether the persons have made or are prepared to make restitution as 
ascertained in accordance with the standards and procedures of Section 77-38a-
302, as a condition of any parole, pardon, remission of fines or 
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forfeitures, or commutation or termination of sentence. 
(6) In determining whether parole may be terminated, the board shall consider 
the offense committed by the parolee, the parole period as provided in Section 76-
3-202, and in accordance with Section 77-27-13. 
U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2)(e)(2003) Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a 
conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was charged with thirty-one second degree felonies. The 
charges were all for communications fraud, issuing a bad check and unlawful 
dealing by a fiduciary. (R. 19-25). On August 10, 2004, the Defendant appeared in 
front of the Honorable Scott M. Hadley and pled guilty to thirteen second degree 
felonies. (R. 161-162). Sentencing was scheduled for October 4, 2004. At the 
sentencing hearing, the prosecutor asked the Court to sentence the Defendant to 
three of the counts consecutive to each other. The State told the Court that it could 
run all of the charges consecutive, but that it was asking that counts one through 
six be run concurrent with each other, that count fifteen run consecutive to one 
through six and that counts twenty through twenty-five run concurrent with each 
other but consecutive to the prior sentences. (R. 255/20-21). 
This proposed sentence would have resulted in essentially a three to forty-
five year sentence. The Court stated to the prosecutor that "my understanding then 
under the statute with the - - the parameters that I would have would put the 
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maximum then at 30 years, minimum at 3 years under the State's 
recommendation." (R. 255/21). The prosecutor responded "Well, no. Forty-five 
years. It would be a maximum of 45 years." (R. 244/21). 
The Court's again stated that "I thought the statute limited me when there 
were multiple counts like this to 30 years, regardless." The prosecutor indicated 
that the court may be correct and that he hadn't read that. (R. 244/21) The 
prosecutor also asked that the Defendant not be given credit for the jourteen 
months that the Defendant had been in jail for. (R. 244/22). 
Defendant's attorney informed the Court that he believed that the Court 
could only sentence two of the one to fifteens to run consecutive. He also 
requested that the Court give the Defendant credit for the fourteen months which 
he had been in jail. (R. 244/25). 
After Defendant's attorney asked for only two of the charges to be run 
consecutive, the prosecutor informed the court that he believed that the Court could 
not make the minimum sentence exceed thirty years. (R. 244/25-26). During the 
hearing, the Court looked up U.C.A. §76-3-401. The trial judge read the statute and 
upon his reading of subsection (6)(a), he believed that if he was to rum three 
sentences consecutive, it would result in a three years to thirty year sentence. (R. 
224/29). The Court also believed that based on its reading of the statute that he 
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had discretion to sentence the Defendant anywhere from one to thirty years up to 
thirteen to thirty years. (R. 224/30). 
The Court sentenced Defendant to thirteen indeterminate terms of one to 
fifteen years at the Utah State Prison. The Court ordered that counts one to six 
were to run consecutive to each other, and that the remaining counts were to run 
concurrent. In the Court's mind, that resulted in a minimum sentence of six years 
and a maximum of thirty years. (R. 224/33). 
The Sentence, Judgment and Commitment was signed on October 4, 2004. 
(R. 166-169). A notice of appeal was filed on November 3, 2004. (R. 187). The 
Court date stamped the notice of appeal on November 10, 2004. (R. 187). 
However, Defendant's appellate attorney who filed the notice of appeal had it date 
stamped at the court and it was stamped on November 3, 2004. (See, addendum 
#1). For some unknown reason, the Court didn't date the official copy until 
November 10,2004. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Defendant was charged with multiple second degree felonies for 
conduct that was related to his attempt to purchase Nordic Valley Ski Resort. The 
Defendant agreed to purchase Nordic Valley for four and a half million dollars. 
($4,500,000.00). The closing was to take place on December 31, 2001. The 
Defendant was to take control of the ski resort on January 1, 2002 and as part of 
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the agreement he would do the day-to-day management and keep all of the 
revenues that were generated. On approximately December 26, 2001 the 
Defendant approached one of the owners and told him that he needed 1o delay 
closing until January 14, 2002, because he was waiting for funding. Nonetheless, 
the Defendant took over operating the ski resort on the first of January and he kept 
the revenues that were generated beginning January 1, 2002. On January 13, 2002, 
the Defendant indicated that he needed to delay closing again because Zion's Bank 
was holding thirty-three million dollars of his and they wouldn't release it to him. 
The Defendant delayed closing a third time, but he wrote out several checks to the 
stockholders of Nordic Valley. He tendered the checks on January 18, 2002, but 
they were post dated to February 25, 2002. Counts one through six were related to 
Defendant's activities with Nordic Valley. 
After Defendant took over operations of Nordic Valley he contacted the Jack 
Johnson Company and contracted with them for services. Defendant wrote the 
Jack Johnson Company a check for $97,500 that bounced. The company alleged 
that they completed approximately $600,000 worth of services. Count fifteen of 
the Information that Defendant pled guilty to was related to his activities 
associated with the Jack Johnson Company. 
At approximately the same time, the Defendant lined up investors for an 
Internet Company called Play-It. The Defendant received approximately 
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$487,000.00 in investment money. He then used some of this money for an 
automobile, a television, computer equipment, and other personal expenses that 
were unauthorized. He also presented the investors with a phony analyzer report 
that indicated that the web site was receiving hundreds of thousands of "hits." In 
August of 2002, the Defendant produced a licensing agreement between Play-It 
and a company called Cyber Link Systems which was supposedly a subsidiary of 
Direct TV. It was later discovered that Direct TV did not have a subsidiary named 
Cyber Links, and the licensing agreement was fabricated. Counts twenty through 
twenty-five were related to the Play-It company. (R. 243/Preliminary Hearing 
Transcripts). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Defendant has requested that counsel appeal the trial court's decision to 
sentence him to serve six consecutive one to fifteen year sentences. Although the 
trial court's belief was that the maximum sentence was for thirty years, the 
Defendant's concern is that the Board of Pardons can and will keep him for longer 
than thirty years because when the totals are added up, the maximum aggregate 
sentence is ninety years. It was the legislature's intention that a defendant under 
this Defendant's circumstances not be ordered to serve more than thirty years. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 
SENTENCED THE DEFENDANT TO SERVE SIX 
CONSECUTIVE ONE TO FIFTEEN YEAR SENTENCES. 
This issue centers on whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
sentencing the Defendant to six consecutive one to fifteen sentences and if the 
court's statutory interpretation was correct. The statute in question is U.C.A. §76-
3-401(2004). This statute addresses a court's imposition of consecutive sentences. 
Subsection (6)(a) states that "[i]f a court imposes consecutive sentences, the 
aggregate maximum of all sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years 
imprisonment, except as provided under Subsection (6)(b)." The trial court 
correctly found that subsection (6)(b) didn't apply.1 (R. 244/28). 
The trial court apparently focused on subsection (8). This subsection reads: 
When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the 
effect of consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be 
served, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as 
though he has been committed for a single term that consists of the 
aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms as follows: 
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the 
maximum sentence is considered to be 30 years; and 
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum 
term, if any, constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed 
minimum terms. 
1
 Subsection (6)(b) applies to offenses for which death or a life sentence is authorized or situation where the 
defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct which occurs after his initial sentence was 
imposed. 
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The trial court interpreted this section to mean that thirty years was the 
maximum the Defendant could be sentenced to but that if the sentences were run 
consecutive it would affect the minimum sentence. (R. 244/28-33). With that 
interpretation of the statute, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to six 
consecutive sentences of one to fifteen years. The court stated; "In my mind, that 
would be a minimum sentence then of six years, maximum of 30 years." (R. 
244/33). 
The problem is that the trial court can't sentence the Defendant to a term of 
six to thirty years. The Court imposed six consecutive sentences. When the 
maximums are added, the result is a minimum sentence of six years and a 
maximum of ninety years. The Defendant acknowledges that subsection (8)(a) 
states that when the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30 year limitation the 
maximum sentence is considered to be 30 years. 
The problem that arises is that U.C.A. §77-27-5 gives the Board of Pardons 
exclusive authority to determine how long an individual will actually serve and 
these decisions are not subject to judicial review. "Decisions of the board in cases 
involving paroles, pardons, commutations or terminations of sentence, restitution, 
or remission of fines or forfeitures are final and are not subject to judicial review." 
U.C.A. §77-27-5(3)(2004). 
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In Linden v. State, 81 P.3d 802 (Utah Ct App. 2003), this Court stated that 
a[u]nder the terms of Utah's indeterminate sentencing system, the Board is given a 
wide degree of discretion in determining how much of a sentence a convicted 
person must serve." Id. at 804. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "the judge 
does not determine the number of years the defendant will spend [in prison]. That 
is left to the unfettered discretion of the board of pardons." Labrum v. Utah State 
Bd of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902, 908 (Utah 1993). 
Under Utah's sentencing scheme, "the board of pardons acts as a sentencing 
entity, having exclusive authority to determine [] the actual number of years a 
defendant is to serve." Preece v. House, 886 P.2d 508, 512 (Utah 1994)(alteration 
in original). See, also, State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 277 (Utah 1985)("our 
sentencing system vests almost complete discretion in the Board of Pardons to 
determine the period of time that will actually be served.") 
These statutes are inconsistent because on one hand section 76-3-401 states 
that if the aggregate sentence exceeds thirty years the maximum will be considered 
to be 30 years. However, Section 77-27-5 leaves the decision as to the actual time 
up to the Board of Pardons and the Utah Supreme Court has interpreted this section 
to mean that judges do not determine the number of years a defendant is to serve 
and the Board of Pardons has almost complete discretion that is rarely subject to 
judicial review. 
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Even though the trial court indicated that the maximum was for thirty years, 
it ran six one to fifteen year sentences consecutive. The math does not add up to 
thirty years. To ensure that the thirty year maximum was imposed the trial court is 
limited to sentencing the Defendant to two consecutive one to fifteen sentences. 
This would have been in harmony with the legislature's intent that a maximum 
sentence not exceed thirty years. 
In State v. Swapp, 808 P.2d 115 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), this Court addressed 
section 76-3-401 in the context of a consecutive indeterminate sentence that was 
run consecutive to a federal determinative sentence. This Court stated that u[w]e 
construe 76-3-401 in the context of the entire sentencing framework to give effect 
to the entire statutory scheme." Id. at 121. This Court also stated that section 76-3-
401 does "not preclude the imposition of consecutive sentences, but merely 
restricts the effect of consecutive sentences." Id. at 120. (alterations in original). 
Under Utah's indeterminate sentencing scheme, the effect of six consecutive 
one to fifteen year sentences is that the Board of Pardons has discretion to decide 
how long the Defendant will stay in prison. The number of years could well exceed 
the thirty year limit the Legislature intended. In State v. Swapp, this Court affirmed 
the trial court's imposition of a consecutive indeterminate sentence to the federal 
sentence. However, the language is applicable to this case. This Court stated that 
"we affirm the trial court's sentence of a term of not less than one year nor more 
15 
than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison, a term to run consecutively to and at the 
end of any and all determinate sentences imposed in federal court, with the 
limitation that all sentences cannot exceed thirty years." Id. at 121-22. In the case 
at bar, the Defendant's sentences do exceed fifteen years. 
In State v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), this Court addressed 
a situation with an issue almost identical to the one in the case at bar. In Horton, 
the defendant was sentenced to seven consecutive sentences that exceeded thirty 
years. This Court held that section 76-3-401 "does not preclude the imposition of 
consecutive sentences that total more than thirty years, but merely restricts the 
actual time served to be no more than thirty years." Id. at 715. 
The Defendant recognizes that the holding in Horton is contrary to his 
position in this case. Nonetheless, he wants to appeal his sentencing and 
respectfully requests this Court to overrule its prior case law. In State v. Menzies, 
889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994), the Utah Supreme Court stated that "[t]hose asking us 
to overturn prior precedent have a substantial burden of persuasion." Id. at 398. 
Before an appellate court overrules prior cases it must be "clearly convinced that 
the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changing 
conditions and that more good than harm will come by departing from precedent." 
Id at 399. 
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The Defendant would suggest that the Legislature's intent that a Defendant 
not be sentenced to serve more than thirty years can be disregarded by the Board of 
Pardons who has almost unfettered authority on sentencing decisions that is not 
subject to judicial review. 
When a court construes a legislative enactment, the court's primary 
responsibility is "to give effect to the intent of the legislature." State v. Jones, 735 
P.2d 399, 402 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). In Deland v. Uintah County, 945 P.2d 172 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997), this Court stated that when "we construe a statute, we first 
explore its plain language and use other modes of interpretation only if the 
language contains ambiguities. Unless a literal reading would render the statute's 
wording unreasonably inoperable or confusing, we accord the wording its 'usual 
and accepted meaning' and do not ' look beyond plain and unambiguous language 
to ascertain legislative intent.'" Id at 174 (quoting US Xpress, Inc. v. Utah State 
Tax Comm % 886 P.2d 1115, 1117 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)). 
The Defendant would suggest that section 76-3-401 's wording is confusing 
and unreasonably inoperable. On one hand, the statute limits the maximum to 
thirty years, showing the Legislature's intent. However, subsection (10) of the 
statute states that "[t]his section may not be construed to restrict the number or 
length of individual consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the 
validity of any sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences 
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actually served under the commitments." U.C.A. §76-3-401(10). Again, it is 
impossible to limit the length of the sentence when the length is to be determined 
by the Board of Pardons. It makes no sense to state that a maximum aggregate 
sentence is to be for thirty years and then say "but we're not going to limit the 
number of years that a defendant can actually be sentenced to serve." This is 
exactly what section 76-3-401 does. Subsection (6)(a) explicitly states that "[i]f a 
court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all sentences 
imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment. . ." Then, four subsections later 
the statue says u[t]his section may not be construed to restrict the number or length 
of individual consecutive sentences that may be imposed . . . " 
If doubt or uncertainty exists as to the meaning of a statute "the court should 
analyze the act in its entirety and harmonize it provisions in accordance with the 
legislative intent and purpose." In Re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 866 (Utah 1996). 
What is clear from section 76-3-401, is that the Legislature intended that 
defendants not be sentenced to more than thirty years on second degree felonies. 
The only way to insure that a criminal defendant in the Defendant's position is not 
sentenced to serve more than thirty years is to limit the number of one to fifteen 
year consecutive sentences to two. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the above, the Defendant respectfully requests this Court to 
remand his case back to the trial court with instructions that only two of his 
sentences can be run consecutive to each other. 
DATED this ^ _ day of August, 2005. 
DEE W. SMITH 
Attorney for Appellant 
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Shurtleff, Attorney General, Attorney for the Plaintiff, 160 East 300 South,, 6th 
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Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner 
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Telephone: (801) 399-4191 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ) 
vs. ) 
GARY RANDALL WHETTON, ) Case No. 031902992 
Defendant/Appellant. ) 
COMES NOW the above named Defendant, Gary Randall Whetton, by and through 
his attorney, Randall W. Richards and hereby gives notice of his intent to appeal the 
sentence, judgment, and conviction that was entered hereon in the above-entitled case on or 
about the 4,h day of October, 2004, to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
DATED this day of November, 2004. 
y ; .* » / A f t . * * ' ' 
RANDALL W. RICHARDS 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that 1 mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 
Notice of Appeal to: 
Weber County Attorney 
2380 Washington Blvd, Second Floor 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Office of the Attorney General 
160 E 300 S, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Utah Court of Appeals 
P .O . Box 140241 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230 
postage prepaid, on this j day of November, 2004. V, ,--'7 A /">
 / 
Secretary 
ADDENDUM B 
SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GARY RANDALL WHETTON, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCING 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 031902992 FS 
Judge: SCOTT M HADLEY 
Date: October 4, 2004 
PRESENT 
Clerk: marykd 
Reporter: SHINGLE, LAURIE 
Prosecutor: MARK R DECARIA 
CAMILLE L. NEIDER 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): RYAN BUSHELL 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: April 18, 1972 
Video 
CHARGES 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/10/2004 Guilty 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/10/2004 Guilty 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/10/2004 Guilty 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/10/2004 Guilty 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/10/2004 Guilty 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/10/2004 Guilty 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/10/2004 Guilty 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/10/2004 Guilty 
21. COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD - 2nd Degree Felony 
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Case No: 031902992 
Date: Oct 04, 2004 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/10/2004 Guilty 
22. COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/10/2004 Guilty 
23. UNLAW DEALING W/PROPERTY BY FIDUCIARY - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/10/2004 Guilty 
24. UNLAW DEALING W/PROPERTY BY FIDUCIARY - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/10/2004 Guilty 
25. UNLAW DEALING W/PROPERTY BY FIDUCIARY - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/10/2004 Guilty 
HEARING 
The prison sentence imposed on counts I - VI is to run 
consecutively to each other but concurrently to the 
prison sentence imposed on count XV and counts 
XX -XXV. The prison sentence imposed on count XV and 
counts XX - XXV may run concurrently each other and to 
the prison sentence imposed on counts I - VI. (Minimum 
of six years with a maximum of 3 0 years pursuant to 
State Statute 76-1-401 (6) (a) . 
The defendant shall pay defense costs accrued in this 
case as a condition of parole. The defendant shall also 
pay restitution as a condition of parole. The restitution 
amount shall be determined at a Restitution Hearing on 
11/29/04. 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
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State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of UNLAW DEALING W/PROPERTY BY 
FIDUCIARY a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen 
years in the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of UNLAW DEALING W/PROPERTY BY 
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FIDUCIARY a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen 
years in the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of UNLAW DEALING W/PROPERTY BY 
FIDUCIARY a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen 
years in the Utah State Prison. 
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
The Court recommends credit for time served of 14 months. 
RESTITUTION HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 11/29/2004 
Time: 11:00 a.m. 
Location: 2nd Floor Southwest 
Second District Court 
252 5 Grant Avenue 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Before Judge: SCOTT M HADLEY 
Dated this */ day of (Po^U^l 20 a Y . 
SCOTT M HADLEY 
District Court Judge 
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals 
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative 
aids and services) during this proceeding should call Stella Perea 
at (801)395-1062 at least three working days prior to the 
proceeding. The general information phone number is (8 01) 
395-1071. 
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Ms. McNeely. 
MS. McNEELY: Yes. I just wanted to say one more 
thing. I think Randy Whetton should be sentenced to life in 
prison and I think he should have very limited visitation 
rights with his young children. I cannot imagine what kind 
of a role model he would be to them. I think this is 
something the Court should take into consideration. 
Thank you. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
From the State? 
MR. DECARIA: Thank you, Your Honor. 
Your Honor, if I might, I think, of course, you're aware 
that there is very little that I could say in addition to 
what you've heard from victims here today that really would 
mean as much and carry the weight and power that victims 
themselves, from their own mouths, can impart to the Court. 
And so I don't want to spend a lot of time on -- on that. 
And I recognize that there is going to be a restitution 
hearing to determine as best as we can what the total number 
is that Randy Whetton should pay and what these individual 
stakeholders in this fraud and scheme to defraud them really 
have lost. 
He has pled guilty to Counts 1 through 6. Those counts 
apply directly to Ski Associates. He pled guilty to 
Count 15, which was the count that involved the defrauding of 
Laurie Shingle, RPR, CMRS 
(801) 395-1055 
and the efforts and energy put into the Nordic Valley 
development by Jack Johnson Company, which to some degree, 
the Court may understand, has worked as a detriment to the — 
the owners of Ski Associates because under the direction 
of -- of Mr. Whetton, Jack Johnson put efforts in there and 
really tore up the golf course, tore up parts of that ground 
that make them unreclaimable for purposes of using them or 
replacing that property back into a usable enterprise for — 
for Ski Associates again. 
So from that perspective, Jack Johnson Company is not 
here, he's a victim, but his energies actually worked to 
further victimize the owners of the -- of Ski Associates. 
And then, of course, Counts 20 through 25, those six 
counts apply directly to the Play It defraud for Mr. Otto and 
that Play It organization. 
I think one of the things that was mentioned by one of 
the people that spoke about the — the message that should be 
sent in a case like this, that message should be that crime 
does not pay. And I think that's one of the by-products of 
sentencing. 
In order to assure that there is ample time for 
Mr. Whetton to ponder his abuses while he sits in jail — or 
prison, excuse me, and for once released on parole -- which 
we all know that eventually he will be — that the other 
entities such as the Board of Pardons have sufficient power 
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over him while on parole to ensure that he make a meaningful 
dent in restitution, I would ask that the Court sentence 
Mr. Whetton to 1 to 15 — three 1 to 15s consecutive: One 
1 to 15, which is the six counts involved from Ski 
Associates; Count number 15, a 1 to 15, the count involving 
Jack Johnson Company; and the six counts involving Play It, 
another 1 to 15, and run those counts consecutive. 
I know that the Court could run them all consecutive, 
but I don't — I — it's not my belief that Mr. Whetton would 
get any additional time on running them all consecutive. 
THE COURT: Can you say that again for me so I 
have --
MR. DECARIA: Okay. 
THE COURT: — the Statefs position correctly? 
MR. DECARIA: Right. 
THE COURT: I might have — 
MR. DECARIA: Hefs got — he — he pled guilty to 
Counts 1 through 6. Those are the counts that apply to Ski 
Associates. He pled guilty to Count 15, which is a count 
that applies to Jack Johnson Company. And he pled guilty to 
Counts 20 through 25 which account — which are those counts 
for Mr. Otto and that Play It computer system. 
And so what Ifm requesting of this Court is to sentence 
him to -- on Counts 1 through 6, 1 to 15 on each, concurrent 
with each other; on Count 15, a 1 to 15 sentence consecutive 
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to the sentences on 1 through 6; and Counts 20 through 25, 
run those sentences concurrent with each other, but 
consecutive to the prior two. So he gets three separate 
1 to 15s, consecutive to each other. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. DECARIA: Does that make sense now? 
THE COURT: It — it does. 
MR. DECARIA: Wefre asking for three separate 
consecutive 1 to 15s. 
THE COURT: And my understanding then under the 
statute with the — the parameters that I would have would 
put the maximum then at 30 years, minimum at 3 years under 
the State's recommendation. Am I — 
MR. DECARIA: Well, no. Forty-five years. It would 
be a maximum of 45 years. One to 15 plus -- possible top of 
15, possible top of 15 on the second group, and a possible 
top at 15 on the third group would be a total of 45 years. 
THE COURT: But I thought the statute limited me 
when there were multiple counts like this to 30 years, 
regardless. 
MR. DECARIA: Well, you know, you may be correct on 
that. I haven't read that. 
THE COURT: But we're really talking about the 
minimum in any event, right? That's the important part in 
terms of --
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1 MR. DECARIA: The 1 to 15s? 
2 THE COURT: Yeah. 
3 MR. DECARIA: But it gives the Board of Pardons 
4 ample time to have Mr. Whetton repose in the facility at the 
5 Weber -- at the state prison. 
6 THE COURT: But under this recommendation then, he 
7 would have a minimum of three years, correct? 
8 MR. DECARIA: That would be the minimum. 
9 THE COURT: Okay. And what about the time that he 
10 has served? What's the State's position on that? 
11 MR. DECARIA: We'd ask that he not be given credit 
12 for that time. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. 
14 MR. DECARIA: There's a very good reason for that, 
15 Your Honor, because while he was in jail pending the court 
16 process, he was there, the community was secure from his — 
17 from his devices. 
18 Thank you. 
19 THE COURT: I didn't mean to interrupt you. Did — 
20 was there more you wanted to say, Mr. DeCaria? 
21 MR. DECARIA: No. Really, that covers it, 
22 I Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Neider, anything else from — 
24 J from you, from the State? 
25 MS. NEIDER: Judge, I was prepared to talk about the 
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restitution. I think based on the amounts that they have in 
the PSI, it's actually closer to 1.5 million dollars that 
we'll be talking about at the restitution hearing because of 
the losses of Jack Johnson Company weren't included in that 
total that's in the body of the PSI. We're prepared to deal 
with that at a restitution hearing. 
THE COURT: Would you agree, though, Ms. Neider, 
that — I mean, obviously, I have the discretion to impose a 
fine, too, but it seems like that would be inappropriate 
given the expected amount of restitution. I would rather 
money go to victims, if any money comes out at all. 
MS. NEIDER: I would — I would agree, Judge. I 
think we would — 
THE COURT: It doesn't seem worthwhile to talk about 
fines, does it? 
MS. NEIDER: We didn't anticipate requesting a fine, 
Judge. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. NEIDER: Any money that he may be able to 
generate lawfully we'd ask go straight to restitution. 
THE COURT: Okay. And I wondered about the Jack 
Johnson portion, too, because although the presentence report 
says it's unable to determine, that's mostly because 
Mr. Whetton's now got the victims fighting amongst 
themselves. 
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But it's -- it's clear that six to $700,000 worth of 
work was done. It's just a matter of who's going to — now 
the victims have to fight it out because they know they're 
not going to get it from Mr. Whetton. 
MS. NEIDER: That's correct. Some of that may — 
THE COURT: But that's really a pretty solid figure. 
MS. NEIDER: Some of that may be civil. They had at 
least $98,000 in hard costs that they had expended, and then 
they had done plans and projections for a lot of the rest of 
it. 
But we would need somebody here from Jack Johnson and we 
would bring them for the restitution hearing for you to hear 
from them. I don't think they actually ended up testifying 
at the prelim, but maybe they did about the work that they 
did and how much they had expended and then how much they had 
expected from the contract that they had entered into. 
THE COURT: Okay. Okay. Thank you. Anything else 
from the State then? 
MR. DECARIA: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Bushell? 
MR. BUSHELL: Yes, Your Honor. If I may, I'd like 
to address the sentencing recommendations of the State. 
Your Honor, it's my understanding -- and I may be 
incorrect on this -- but with the sentencing the State is 
requesting three separate 1 to 15s. It's my reading of the 
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statute — I don't have a copy before me and I apologize — 
that the most he could be sentenced to with this many counts 
is two separate 1 to 15s. 
If that were the case, Your Honor, and you wanted to run 
those consecutive, we would ask this Court to follow a two — 
two 1 to 15s consecutive — consecutive sentences, and put 
the minimum amount at two years. 
We are also requesting, Your Honor, credit for time 
served. Mr. Whetton has been locked up for 14 months pending 
the outcome of this. He does have a family, two small 
children and a stepdaughter. You read the reports. He's a 
good father and good husband. 
He realizes he's made a mistake. He's willing to do 
the -- the time and make the restitution that will be decided 
at a later date. 
We would ask Your Honor if it is in this Court's 
discretion to sentence consecutive, that only two of the 
counts be sentenced consecutive. 
Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. DECARIA: Your Honor, can I venture something 
here? My belief about maximums and minimums is that the way 
the Code works, applying mostly to first degree felonies that 
carry five to lives, that if the Court intended to stack five 
to lives, the Court could not make the minimum on, you know, 
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ten 5 to lives, more than 30 years. I don't think it applies 
to maximums. ] 
MS. NEIDER: Minimums. 
MR. DECARIA: Excuse me. To minimums. 
THE COURT: Well, I've got it here. I think this is 
important. Let's go over it to make sure at least we agree 
on what the law is so that -- I'm looking at 76-3-401. 
Would it help if I passed out — I've got a copy here, 
but I can pass out the actual Code and maybe all counsel can 
look at that. 
MR. DECARIA: Can I approach, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: You may. 
MR. BUSHELL: May I follow? 
THE COURT: Okay. In fact, you might want to take 
this back with you so our -- everybody can hear. 
I -- I think it's important we get this part right so we 
know what discretion I do or don't have. I think the -- the 
victims ought to be aware of that, too. There it is. It's 
on that page. 
First of all, while — while counsel are looking at 
that, I do want to speak to the victims. And thank you for 
sending information and for sending it to the Court on time. 
Often we get these literally as we're walking into court and 
they're of little use then. Even if you can read them, it 
takes some time to digest it and kind of get what the victims 
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are feeling, so thank you for doing that. 
But while they're looking at that a little bit, I do 
want the victims to understand in Utah we sentence to 
indeterminate terms, meaning that the Court basically sets 
large parameters, but the actual time that's spent is not 
decided by the Court. It's decided by the Board of Pardons 
and Parole. So the -- the Court sets broad parameters, but 
that's about it. 
For instance, on a third degree felony, if the Court — 
and that's not this case. I'm just giving you an example. 
But on a third degree felony, the possible sentence is zero 
to five years. So that's all the Court does is say we 
sentence you to prison for zero to five years. And then the 
Board of Pardons and Parole says, you know, whether that's 
one day or five years. 
So that's -- that's kind of how it works. So when we 
talk about 1 to 15 years on one count, the Court sentences 
Mr. Whetton to 1 to 15 years and then my job is done. Then 
the Board of Pardons and Parole says whether that's one year 
or fifteen years or something in between. So just so you'll 
understand, it's not as if I sit here and give the exact 
amount of time. 
But now with that said, let me turn back to counsel. 
In -- I'm looking at section (6) of that -- of section 401 
and it says, if a Court imposes consecutive sentences, the 
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aggregate maximum of all sentences imposed may not exceed 30 
years imprisonment, except — and in my opinion, those 
exceptions do not apply. 
So arenft I faced with that's the maximum? And it seems 
like regardless of whether I say it or not here today, that 
the Board of Pardons and Parole would treat it that way. Am 
I reading that wrong? 
MR. BUSHELL: Your Honor, in my reading, I believe 
you're reading it correctly. 
THE COURT: That that would be the maximum that the 
Board of Pardons and Parole could do. Even if I said 
consecutive on all 13 count, 30 would be the maximum. 
For the State, do you read that differently? 
MR. DECARIA: I don't. I read it the same. 
Under those circumstances, Your Honor, I — I'm not sure 
we're satisfied with three consecutive 1 to 15s. 
THE COURT: Well — well, let me go on then to see 
if this changes anything that the State may want to say or 
the defense. 
Then in subsection (8) it says, when the limitation of 
subsection (6) (a) applies -- that's the 30 year -- it says 
determining the effect of consecutive sentences and the 
manner in which they shall be served, the Board of Pardons 
and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been 
committed for a single term that consists of the aggregate of 
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the validity — or of the validly, I guess, imposed prison 
terms as follows: If the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 
30-year limitation, the maximum sentence is considered to be 
30 years. So that's on the maximum end. 
And when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the 
minimum term, if any, constitutes the aggregate of the 
validly imposed minimum terms. 
So that's where I'm reading that if — if the State says 
three consecutive terms and the rest to run concurrent, that 
basically I'm looking at then 3 to 30 years is what the State 
would be recommending that I do. 
And at this point, I think the defense would be saying 
two, right? 
MR. BUSHELL: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Right. Which if — if I'm reading these 
right would be ~- mean 2 to 30 years. Is that the defense's 
position? 
MR. BUSHELL: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. Anything else the defense would 
like to say about that, just in terms of what the Law is? I 
want to make sure the range --
MR. BUSHELL: Your Honor, I believe that is a 
correct reading of the law. 
THE COURT: Okay. Now, back to the State. Am I 
reading that incorrectly or is there --
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MR. DECARIA: Well, I think you're reading it 
correctly that it — it would be 3 to 30 under the State's 
recommendations. 
THE COURT: Right. And I didn't know if my reading 
then changes the State's position or not because it — what I 
view I have discretion on is, first of all, probation or not 
probation. I think most would agree that's probably not 
appropriate. I know Mr. Whetton said that when we took his 
plea that he didn't believe that he would get probation. 
We've talked about fines. They're probably somewhat 
meaningless in this case. 
So if we are looking at prison, my view is I have 
discretion to go from — anywhere from 1 to 30 years up to 13 
to 30 years. That's what I view I have discretion to do. 
And --
Ms. 
MR. 
THE 
DECARIA: 
COURT: 
I think 
And/or to 
Neider says, in my mind the 
MR. 
meaningless. 
monies 
the Stc 
THE 
DECARIA: Right. 
I'd rather have 1 
COURT: Even if f 
you' 
impc 
re 
>se 
correct. 
fines, but as 
By appear to be meaningless 
I — 
Lhat 
ines 
- I think fines are 
money go to victims. 
were imposed, 
collected first go to victims? 
MR. 
THE 
DECARIA 
COURT: 
ate would like 
: True. 
Okay. So 
to say? 
does that change < 
wouldn't 
anything 
any 
that 
Laurie Shingle, RPR, CMRS 
(801) 395-1055 
MR. DECARIA: Your Honor, I think the way — if — 
if I might make a recommendation, the way this ought to be 
sentenced is you sentence him to three 1 to 15s consecutive 
and let the Board make a determination as to how the statute 
is applied. You don!t need to say 3 to 30. You say three 
consecutive 1 to 15s. 
THE COURT: Okay. But, in essence, then the State 
would stand by its recommendation made earlier, correct? 
MR. DECARIA: I suppose. It's the appropriate 
recommendation. 
THE COURT: Okay. Okay. Anything else from the 
defense? 
MR. BUSHELL: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Vincent, did you wish to be 
heard at all? 
MS. VINCENT: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. I do have one further question 
that would help me out. In -- in addition to reading all 
that Ifve read and hearing from the victims and from 
Mr. Whetton and those who support him, it does seem like this 
sentence, whatever it is, should be proportionate to the 
crimes that he has admitted doing and to when other people 
have committed similar crimes. 
Do you feel, from the State's end, that the 
recommendation being made is proportionate in that sense? 
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For instance, with other types of crimes of this nature with 
this many counts? Is it — is it in the ballpark that way? 
MR. DECARIA: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. And what about from the defense 
side? 
MR. BUSHELL: Your Honor, obviously the defense is 
going to have a little different take on -- on this. 
Proportionality is something that comes before the Court 
often enough. I know recently Mr. Wayne Ogden was sentenced 
to somewhat -- somewhat similar charges with a lot more money 
and he did two 1 to 15 years on that. 
All that being said, I think, however, that the sentence 
recommendation is something that both Mr. Whetton and I knew 
was going to happen. We — we think that it's proportional 
for the crimes that Mr. Whetton did admit to and pled guilty 
to. 
THE COURT: Okay. Okay. Anything else by any party 
then before sentence is announced? 
MR. BUSHELL: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Let me just look at my own notes 
real quick. 
Okay. You ready? 
MR. BUSHELL: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Okay. Mr. Whetton, itfs the 
sentence of this Court in connection with your conviction of 
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1 10 counts of a second degree felony, communications fraud, 
2 I and two counts — excuse me, three counts of, also, second 
3 degree felonies, unlawful dealing with property by a 
4 I fiduciary, a total of 13 second degree felonies, that you be 
5 sentenced as follows. 
6 That you be sentenced to the Utah State Prison for 13 
7 indeterminate terms of 1 to 15 years, and that you be ordered 
8 I to pay restitution to the victims in an amount to be 
9 determined at a restitution hearing. And that you pay 
10 defense costs as a condition of your -- any release on 
11 parole. 
12 That Counts 1 through 6 run consecutive with each other 
13 and the remaining counts run concurrent. In my mind, that 
14 would be a minimum sentence then of six years, maximum of 30 
15 years. 
16 And we'll set it for a restitution hearing -- Ifm 
17 assuming it would take quite some time. 
18 MS. NEIDER: Most of the day, Judge. 
19 THE COURT: You think a day? Okay. I did not bring 
20 my calendar out. 
21 I Mary Kaye, do you have yours — 
22 THE CLERK: I do. 
23 THE COURT: — so we can set that? Okay. We've had 
24 some spaces, I think -- well, I don't know if they opened up 
25 or not. 
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